Risk taking is a basic trade-off between the mean and variance of the outcomes of one's behavior. While risk attitudes are well studied across psychology, neuroscience, and economics, little is known about how individual risk preferences evolve. Specifically, the relationship between risk taking and wealth (both endowment and accumulated experimental earnings) remains an open question.
Commonly employed economic models of risky choice assume that the propensity to avoid risk (absolute risk aversion) decreases as one accumulates wealth. The basic intuition here is that the more wealth you have, the better you are able to cushion potential losses. Prospect theory, the most prominent model for studying risk in psychology, provides less guidance on this point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Prospect theory features a reference point, above which payoffs are considered gains and below which payoffs are considered losses. The reference point in the model lends it flexibility but also complicates behavioral predictions as it allows decisions to be evaluated either in isolation or in a wider context, such as total earnings. Assuming the latter case, behavior typically shifts from risk-seeking below the reference point (in the loss domain) to risk-averse above the reference point (in the gain domain). Within either domain though, risk aversion decreases with more wealth. In other words, we might expect to see both increasing and decreasing risk aversion as earnings accumulate, depending on where one stands relative to the reference point.
Empirical evidence, both field and experimental, has been inconclusive about wealth effects. Risk aversion has been shown to decrease with a larger endowment (Fafchamps et al., 2015) , with more accumulated earnings (Levy, 1994) , and after single-trial gains (Thaler and Johnson, 1990 ) (a phenomenon known as the ''house money effect''). On the other hand, risk aversion has also occasionally been shown to increase with accumulated earnings, though here the results varied across cultures (Fafchamps et al., 2015) . The take-away message is that there is a fairly clear belief in decreasing absolute risk aversion but a paucity of clear empirical findings. More importantly, this question has been largely ignored in neuroscience, with only rare exceptions (Hytö nen et al., 2014) . Juechems et al. (2017) address this topic with a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of risky decisions with accumulating earnings, using a new model of dynamic risk preferences that derives from their previous work on adaptive gain in perceptual decision making.
A serious complication with studying the effects of earnings on risk behavior is disentangling those effects from the effects of passing time. Juechems et al. (2017) employ a standard choice task, where subjects decide whether to accept or reject different gambles, but cleverly use a series of ''contexts,'' with each context having its own ''money pot'' that accumulates earnings from that context. Participants knew how many trials contributed to each context, but were not able to see, in any explicit way, how much money they accumulated in the pot. At the end of each scanner run, subjects received the actual earnings from one randomly selected context. In this way, Juechems et al. (2017) were able to repeatedly study the effects of accumulating earnings within subject and separate the effects of time from effects of wealth.
In terms of anatomical localization, there is emerging consensus that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) encodes the value of reward, including, but not limited to, monetary gains. Juechems et al. (2017) confirm this by identifying a blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal correlated with the momentary reward in each trial of the experiment. More interestingly, their study is the first to demonstrate that a more anterior region of the vmPFC tracks the unseen accumulated wealth (Figure 1 ). So the neural data demonstrate that subjects are in fact monitoring their accumulated earnings in each context. The more anterior location of this activity is consistent with a recently identified posterior-toanterior vmPFC gradient of value representation for concrete-to-abstract reward (Clithero and Rangel, 2014) . That is, the current trial's earnings are concrete, while the overall accumulated earnings may be more abstract.
These findings contrast with those of Hytö nen et al. (2014), who studied pairs of sequential gambles and also found that vmPFC encoded current trial gains more than losses, but did not report any increased activity following gain trials.
Admittedly, these two studies are difficult to compare since it is impossible to definitively attribute the Hytö nen et al.
(2014) effects to cumulative earnings versus simple spillover from the previous trial's outcome.
In line with the neural findings, subjects' behavior also seemed to track the amount of money they accumulated: as they earned more within a context, they tended to make safer choices. Again, this is quite surprising, given the prevailing assumption that more earnings should lead to less risk aversion. To explain these findings, Juechems et al. (2017) compare their model, previously applied only to perceptual decisions, to standard risk-aversion and prospect theory models, as well as several enhanced versions of those models. The best-fitting model was Juechems et al. (2017) 's adaptive gain model, where accumulated earnings cause shifts in the sigmoidal gain curve that transforms utility into choices. These upward shifts lead to a bias that favors more cautious choices.
This research highlights how insights from perception may provide new, potentially better, models for value-based decision making. Juechems et al. (2017) find that their adaptive gain model produces behavior that is consistent with the idea that subjects do not just maximize their expected reward, but rather minimize the chance of falling below some threshold wealth (for instance, zero). While this behavior is qualitatively consistent with prospect theory, the adaptive gain model provides a better quantitative fit, at least in this setting.
The analogy between perceptual and economic (value-based) decision making is worth further consideration. An emerging literature in neuroeconomics and decision neuroscience has sought to link perceptual and economic decision making using models from neuroscience, including sequential sampling models (Polanía et al., 2014) and normalization (Woodford, 2014) . While the joint consideration of these problems has yielded many fruits, it is also important to consider differences between these settings. For instance, while visual adaptation to past stimuli is a straightforward concept, it is less obvious what it means to adapt to accumulated earnings. Since the total earnings are not directly experienced, the mechanism relies on adaptation to each trial's earnings. In that case, should we interpret the observed activity in vmPFC as an explicit representation of accumulated earnings, or instead as an implicit representation of the sum of past adjustments, captured by the model's bias parameter b?
Along these lines, it is important to note that in Juechems et al. (2017) 's model, the adaptation occurs in utility space rather than dollar space. That is, the decision maker does not adapt to the dollar amounts received and distort the perception of future dollar amounts (as in Woodford, 2014) . Instead, the dollar outcomes are always perceived in the same way, in the sense that they undergo the same transformation from dollar amount to utility. The distortion occurs after this transformation in the conversion from utility to choice.
It is interesting to note that while subjects in the study appeared to track accumulated earnings within a context, they did not appear to track earnings across contexts. To some extent, this is by design, since only one context per run was selected for payment. On the other hand, if subjects consider their earnings in the context of the whole run or experiment, one might in fact expect higher earnings in other contexts to have similar effects as earnings within the context. Why this did not seem to occur is an interesting question for future research: what factors cause individuals to separate one context from another, and can this be detected with fMRI? As one potential clue, Juechems et al. (2017) find that more dorsal regions of prefrontal cortex appear to track a subject's position within a context. The behavioral economics literature on mental accounting may also provide some guidance here (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) .
On a similar note, it is interesting to ask what factors influence the effect of accumulated earnings on risk behavior. Does it matter whether the earnings occur all at once or in smaller chunks? Is it necessary that the earnings arise from subjects' past decisions, or can they be due to initial endowments or income shocks beyond the subjects' control? In one of the experiments run by Fafchamps et al. (2015) , they find opposite effects of initial endowments and accumulated earnings on risk taking. Thus, these two sources of earnings may be treated as separate mental accounts. As another example, a study with macaques showed that they become more risk seeking under more prosperous conditions, specifically shorter time intervals between trials (Hayden and Platt, 2007) . Do these seemingly conflicting results have to do with the size or modality of the reward, the temporal nature of the macaque experiment, or simply with the different species? Answers to these questions should help to shed more light on the neural mechanisms underlying risk taking.
Finally, beyond the obvious importance of understanding how individuals' risk attitudes change as a function of their wealth, this issue is also of methodological importance. Many argue that in order to properly measure risk preferences, it is important to incentivize only one randomly selected decision out of the many that subjects make in an experiment. With a sum of their earnings being paid, individuals may hedge their bets across trials, creating a ''portfolio effect '' (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009) . Others have argued that individuals tend not to consider their decisions in the broader context of their overall earnings, a phenomenon known as ''narrow bracketing,'' a type of mental accounting (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) . This debate has implications for experimental design and interpretation and could partially account for differences in risk attitudes observed across studies. The current study suggests that the answer may lie somewhere in the middle; subjects seem to account for accumulated earnings within a context, but they do not seem to account for earnings in the other contexts or runs of the experiment.
